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the efficiency of the labour regulatory environment in South Africa. In November 2007, 
key	stakeholders	from	government,	 labour	and	business	attended	a	workshop	on	the	
Labour Regulatory Environment in South Africa at the Mount Grace Hotel, Magaliesberg, 
where the results of the aforementioned studies were presented and debated.  This 
paper	 is	an	attempt	at	synthesising	 these	debates	 for	a	non-legal	audience,	of	what	
some commentators have referred to as the ‘Mount Grace Consensus’
Labour	 law	 experts	 generally	 agree	 that	 the	 current	 challenges	 in	 the	 regulatory	
environment	have	arisen	disproportionately	 from	the	 improper	realisation	of	 the	 labour	
market reforms introduced in the mid-1990s. The paper provides for an overview then of 
the	key	concerns	amongst	employers	and	employees	and	the	various	parameters	of	the	
economy’s labour legislative and institutional environment. These traverse the areas of, 
interalia, hiring and firing clauses, interpretation of procedural fairness, Codes of Good 
Practice and the importance of efficient and effective institutions of the labour market. 
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A Synthesis of Current Issues in the Labour Regulatory Environment
 1. Introduction 
Over the past two years, a selection of research papers, in the main written by 
labour	 law	experts,	have	provided	critical	 input	and	guidance	on	 the	nature	of	 the	
debate around the efficiency of the labour regulatory environment in South Africa. In 
November	2007,	key	stakeholders	from	government,	 labour	and	business	attended	a	
workshop on the labour regulatory environment in South Africa, where the results of the 
aforementioned studies were presented and debated.1		
This paper is a synopsis of the above-mentioned body of research and implicitly 
incorporates the tenor and content of the inputs at that workshop. The study is intended 
for	a	non-legal	audience	with	 the	expressed	aim	of	presenting	 the	key	 issues	 in	 the	
current	regulatory	debate	 in	a	manner	which	 is	accessible	to	those	outside	the	 labour	
law profession. 
Labour	 law	experts	generally	 agree	 that	 the	 current	 challenges	 in	 the	 regulatory	
environment	have	arisen	disproportionately	from	the	improper	realisation	of	the	labour	
market reforms introduced in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, the reforms understandably 
did	not	anticipate,	and	therefore	provide	for,	 the	evolving	nature	of	 the	 labour	market	
since 1994. Key relevant shifts here, has been a labour market characterised by 
increasingly atypical forms of employment.
The paper firstly reviews, in brief, the context, in terms of the wider legal framework and 
the labour market environment in the South African economy. Section 3 focuses on the 
key legal debates around unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices. In each of these 
areas, the main concerns are presented, along with the experts’ suggestions on how 
to best address these challenges. Section 4 presents the challenges faced by the key 
labour market institutions, as well as possible areas for policy intervention. Section 5 
concludes.
	 Labour	Regulatory	Environment	in	South	Africa,	9	November	2007,	Mount	Grace	Hotel,	Magaliesberg.
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 2. Context
When	debating	the	key	 issues	 in	 the	 labour	regulatory	environment,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
consider	 the	wider	 legal	 framework	–	such	as	the	relevant	 international	conventions,	
the South African Constitutions and the set of South African labour laws – as well as the 
labour	market	environment	which	provides	the	context	for	the	implementation	of	labour	
market regulations. These parameters, in fact, remain at the core of any discussion 
around labour regulation in South Africa.
 2.1 International Conventions, Constitution and Labour  Regulation
South Africa is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and as 
such has ratified a number of ILO Conventions. This means that the country’s labour 
legislation and regulations have to comply with the ILO Constitution and those ratified 
Conventions. Amongst others, these obligations include upholding the rights to freedom 
of association, to engage in collective bargaining, to equality at work and to eliminate 
forced labour and child labour (Cheadle, 2006: 4; Van Niekerk, 2007: 6).
The South African Constitution has a Bill of Rights that entrenches various rights that 
has to be taken into account when labour regulation is drawn up and implemented. 
These include the rights to equality, freedom of assembly, access to courts and 
administrative justice and also labour rights. Section 23 of the Constitution specifically 
relates to labour relations. It states that “everyone has the right to fair labour practice” 
and	sets	out	the	rights	of	workers,	employers,	trade	union	and	employer	organisations	
(RSA, 1996). These rights can be limited by a law of general application but only if it 
meets certain standards of justification set by the Constitution (Cheadle, 2006: 4). 
The incoherent and inconsistent, and in many cases, still racist, system of industrial 
relations	which	characterised	 the	pre-1994	era	was	clearly	 in	need	of	 significant	
overhaul with the advent of democratic rule. Within the labour market policy 
environment, the immediate period following the election of the first majority government 
was characterised by a frantic process of recasting the country’s labour regulatory 
environment. The outcome of negotiations between employers and employees as 
well as significant rewriting of existing laws, were four key pieces of legislation. These 

A Synthesis of Current Issues in the Labour Regulatory Environment
are the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(BCEA) of 1997, the Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1998 and the Skills Development 
Act (SDA) of 1999. The LRA and BCEA were amended in 2002, while the Employment 
Equity Act was amended in 2006. These four Acts provide the legal foundation for the 
South African labour market.   
The LRA, in addition, provided for a Code of Good Practice, to set guidelines 
for	 the	processes	 to	be	 followed	by	employers	and	 the	 labour	market	 institutions	 in	
implementing the labour legislation. At the time, it was envisaged that the Code would 
be	updated	on	a	regular	basis	 in	order	 to	 incorporate	 the	 judgements	of	 the	Labour	
Courts	which	would	 then	provide	 further	guidance	on	how	the	 legislation	should	be	
interpreted. (Bhorat & Cheadle, 2007: 11).
These legal parameters are important, as any discussion around labour legislation and 
potential reform has to take account of the above. Many economists’ debates often 
ignore these facets and hence may end up, unfortunately, sounding superfluous. 
 2.2 Changing Labour Market Environment
While	 the	section	above	has	highlighted	 the	 importance	of	considering	 the	broader	
legal	context	when	discussing	labour	market	regulation	and	reform,	it	is	also	important	
to	consider	 that	 the	 labour	market	 is	not	static,	and	 that	 labour	 regulation	and	any	
regulatory	reforms	must	account	 for	 the	evolving	 labour	market	as	well	as	changes	 in	
society and the economy in general.		
Within an environment of rising employment (and unemployment) levels, the South 
African economy has also witnessed a steep increase in atypical employment since 
the mid-1990s. Atypical employment includes arrangements such as outsourcing, 
labour brokering and part-time contracts (Bhorat et al, 2007: 50), as well as informal 
employment and self-employment. Workers engaged in atypical forms of employment	
generally enjoy very limited or no protection under the current labour legislation.
2	 This	 section	 incorporates	 comments	 and	 discussions	 by	 participants	 at	 a	 workshop	 on	 the	 Labour	 Regulatory	
Environment	in	South	Africa,	9	November	2007,	Mount	Grace	Hotel,	Magaliesberg.
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One of the key problems is that atypical employment can take such a variety of forms 
and each of these “types” presents its own set of challenges. It is therefore crucial 
to address the definition and measurement of atypical employment. Certain forms 
of atypical employment may be working quite well. Long-term fixed contracts are an 
example	of	atypical	employment,	but	 these	workers	are	generally	not	particularly	
vulnerable or in need of protection. It has further been argued that atypical employment 
suits the needs of certain industries. In the service industry in particular, atypical 
employment	is	useful	to	deal	with	seasonality	and	any	regulatory	reform	needs	to	take	
this into account.
It is not only the definition of atypical employment that is problematic. Differentiating 
between temporary and permanent employment can also be problematic. A classic 
example	of	this	problem	is	the	contract	cleaning	industry	–	employment	is	this	industry	
is	generally	described	as	temporary	based	on	the	fact	that	a	contract	has	been	signed	
for a limited time period. It can, however, also be defined as formal employment, as a 
formal contract of employment has been drawn up and contractual law applies. 
The issue of “triangular” employment is another example of where current 
labour legislation provides no guidelines on how to deal with the situation. In 
this	employment	 relationship	 there	are	 three	parties,	namely	 the	employee,	 the	
employer (or client) and the labour broker or agency. In this scenario, the worker 
has no protection or rights – if the client/employer wants to fire a worker, the worker 
does not enjoy any protection against unfair dismissal. There is evidence that 
temporary	employment	services	are	used	by	employers	who	want	 to	circumvent	
labour regulations. It has been suggested that these brokers or agencies should 
be required to register with the Department of Labour which may make it easier to 
monitor their activities.  
Another feature of the post-apartheid labour market has been the increase in the 
number of Small, Micro and Medium enterprises (SMMEs). It has been suggested 
that SMMEs suffer excessively under the burden of labour legislation and that they 
generally	do	not	have	 the	 financial	or	administrative	 resources	 to	comply	with	all	
regulatory requirements. This does not, however, imply that SMMEs should be exempt 
from regulatory requirements. Complete exemption for SMMEs may act as a perverse 
incentive	where	 larger	employers	deliberately	 reduce	 their	workforce	 to	circumvent	
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labour regulation.  In order to address the regulatory burden on SMMEs it is, however, 
critical that we establish the exact extent of the burden on SMMEs and how it maybe 
inhibits the growth of SMMEs.   
In	summary,	when	reviewing	the	key	issues	in	the	regulatory	debate,	 it	should	always	
be	kept	 in	mind	 that	any	reforms	have	 to	be	 informed	by	 the	wider	 legal	 framework	
within which they operate and regulatory fixes should always be based on an accurate 
empirical	 appreciation	 of	 changing	 labour	 market	 conditions	 and	 dynamic	 in	 an	
economy.
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 3. Unfair Dismissals and Unfair Labour Practices
Some	of	 the	most	widely	debated	issues	in	the	 labour	regulatory	environment	revolve	
around	 the	provisions	 for	and	remedies	against	unfair	dismissals	and	unfair	 labour	
practices in the LRA.4 Section 185 of the LRA states that “every employee has the right 
not to be (a) unfairly dismissed; and (b) subjected to unfair labour practice (LRA, 1995). 
The only employees that do not enjoy these rights are those that are excluded from the 
LRA itself (Van Niekerk, 2007: 15). 
 3.1 Unfair Dismissals
The LRA, in conjunction with the Code of Good Practice:  Dismissal provides the course 
of action that has to be followed when an employer wishes to dismiss a worker. The 
LRA defines what is meant by “dismissal”, what is an “automatically unfair dismissal” 
and also what can be considered a “fair” reason for dismissal, that is, reasons related 
to misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements. The act also requires that 
any dismissal must be done in accordance with “fair procedure” by following the 
guidelines set out in the Code of Good Practice. It also sets out the remedies available 
to employees who feel that they have been unfairly treated (RSA, 1995).  
In terms of fairness, two aspects have to be considered. A dismissal has to be 
substantively fair. This means that, the reason for the dismissal must be fair and given 
the provisions of the LRA can only be related to misconduct, incapacity or operational 
requirements. A dismissal also has to be procedurally fair, in other words the procedure 
followed in the dismissal has to be fair. The standards of fairness are supposed to be 
set out in the Code of Good Practice, with it in essence providing the guidelines to 
be	followed	when	dismissing	 for	 reasons	 for	misconduct,	 incapacity	and	operational	
requirements. At the time of drafting the LRA, the intention was for the Code of Good 
Practice	 to	 be	 updated	 regularly	 to	 keep	 up	 to	 date	 with	 decisions	 made	 by	 the	
Labour Courts and the CCMA. In addition, the Code should also allow the opportunity 
to depart from the guidelines if the circumstances can justify it (Bhorat & Cheadle, 
4	 While	dismissals	are	not,	of	course,	the	only	area	of	regulatory	debate,	the	issues	have	certainly	dominated	recent	
discussion,	hence	our	focus	here.
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2007: 11, Cheadle, 2006: 26, 27). In the section below we first discuss dismissals 
for misconduct and incapacity before moving on to dismissals for operational requirements. 	
	
3.1.1 Dismissal for Misconduct and Incapacity
As mentioned above, dismissals have to be fair in terms of the procedures followed. 
The guidelines for the steps to be followed in the case of a dismissal for misconduct 
and incapacity are set out in the Code of Good Practice. These guidelines require the 
employer to first conduct an investigation to determine whether there are grounds for 
dismissal	and	 then	 to	notify	 the	employee	of	 the	allegations	 in	a	 language	and	 in	a	
format that the employee can understand. The employee should be allowed to respond 
and be given enough time to prepare a response. In addition, assistance from a trade 
union representative or fellow employee is allowed. After the enquiry the employer 
should notify the employee of the outcome, preferably in writing. The Code states quite 
specifically that the investigation “does not need to be a formal enquiry” (RSA, 1995: 
151).
It	has	been	argued,	however,	 that	 the	way	in	which	employers	have	been	interpreting	
the requirements for procedural fairness is overly strict and results in complex pre-
dismissal hearings in the workplace. These employers are often influenced by labour 
consultants,	 lawyers,	arbitrators	and	 judges	who	continue	 to	 follow	 the	procedures	
developed under the old LRA. While these onerous requirements of procedural fairness 
place huge burdens on employers (particularly SMMEs), they do not play any role in 
promoting workers’ rights (Cheadle, 2006: 29; Van Niekerk, 2007: 20). It appears that 
the main beneficiaries of this approach may indeed be the providers of advice and 
services to employers and employees. It has also been suggested that the overly strict 
interpretation	of	procedural	fairness	have	contributed	to	employers	increasing	their	use	
of atypical employment in order to avoid dealing with the perceived requirements (Van 
Niekerk, 2007: 24). 
Experts agree that the responsibility for changing the (overly) strict and complex 
procedural requirements rests on the shoulders of the institutions responsible for dispute 
resolution such as the Labour Courts and the CCMA. They should lead by example by 
changing	their	approach	and	not	demanding	more	technical	pre-dismissal	procedures	
than required by the Code of Good Practice (Cheadle, 2006: 29 & Van Niekerk, 2007: 
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23). (In Section 4 we return to this issue in our discussion of labour market institutions). 
As Roskam (2007: 13) points out, this may require extensive education and training 
of	all	stakeholders,	 including	arbitrators,	human	resource	personnel	and	trade	union	
representatives, to ensure that they are aware of what is actually required by law in 
terms of procedural fairness. In addition, he also suggests that the Code should be 
changed to require that compensation for substantive unfairness should be greater than 
compensation for procedural unfairness in order to de-emphasise procedural fairness.
The financial burden on SMMEs is particularly large. At the moment the Code allows a 
different	approach	to	be	taken	with	regard	to	dismissals	for	incapacity	and	misconduct	
depending on the number of workers employed in the company (RSA, 1995: 150). It 
does not, however, present guidelines on how SMMEs should conduct dismissals and 
currently the Labour Court and the CCMA do not treat SMMEs any differently than other 
employers when a dismissal is challenged by the affected employees. Suggestions 
on how to deal with this situation range from the exemption of SMMEs from unfair 
dismissal laws completely (Van Niekerk, 2007: 18) to adapting the Code of Good 
Practice to set specific guidelines for dealing with small business (Roskam, 2007: 13) 
or even establishing a separate Code for SMMEs (Cheadle, 2006: 45).
Currently	 the	 laws	on	dismissal	apply	 to	all	employees,	 regardless	of	 their	 level	of	
seniority or skill. It has been suggested that senior managers and even professionals 
can be excluded from protection from unfair dismissal as they are adequately protected 
in terms of their employment contracts. Some evidence also suggests that senior 
managers use the free services offered by the CCMA to get large financial settlements 
(Cheadle, 2006: 28; Van Niekerk, 2007:  15). 
While South Africa has not ratified the ILO Convention No. 158 (Termination of 
Employment Convention 1982), it provides the international standard against which the 
current laws of dismissal can be evaluated. In terms of Convention No. 158, both small 
businesses	and	senior	management	can	be	excluded	the	laws	on	unfair	dismissal	(Van	
Niekerk, 2007).
A number of problems have been identified with the Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal. The most critical is that the Code of Good Practice has not been updated 
to keep up with the new decisions and judgements by the CCMA and the Labour 
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Court (Cheadle, 2006: 27). As a result the Code has become outdated and one of the 
key	recommendations	that	 labour	 lawyers	agree	on	 is	 that	 it	should	be	updated	as	a	
matter of urgency. In addition, this should be a regular occurrence and the speed at 
which changes are negotiated at Nedlac should be addressed. (Cheadle, 2006: 26, 27; 
Roskam, 2007: 13). 
3.1.2 Dismissal for Operational Requirements
Dismissal for operational requirements refers to retrenchment. In terms of Section 188 
an	employer	may	retrench	workers	 if	 there	 is	a	 fair	 reason	based	on	 its	operational	
requirements. The test of substantive fairness (that is, if the reason for retrenchment is 
considered to be fair) has been interpreted in different ways by the Labour Court and 
the Labour Appeals Court, varying from retrenchment being recognised as a legitimate 
way to increase profits to it being allowed as a “measure of last resort”. It is expected 
that this debate will continue in the courts (Roskam, 2007: 15, 16). 
Again, when employees are retrenched certain guidelines and procedures have to be 
followed and these are set out in Sections 189 and Section 189A of the LRA (LRA, 
1995). The guidelines set out in Section 189 refer to the procedures that should be 
followed	to	ensure	that	proper	consultation	takes	place	with	all	relevant	parties	in	order	
to try and find a way to minimise the number of workers to be retrenched, change 
the	 timing	of	dismissal,	mitigate	 the	adverse	effects	of	 retrenchment	or	even	avoid	
retrenchment completely. Consultation is also required to determine the appropriate 
method of retrenchment, the selection criteria and severance pay. Written notice 
has	to	be	given	by	 the	employer	 to	 the	workers	with	all	 relevant	 information	and	the	
workers	should	be	given	the	opportunity	 to	make	presentations	on	any	 issue	relevant	
to the proposed dismissals. The guidelines apply to all employers, irrespective of the 
number of workers it employs. In other words, SMMEs also have to follow the above 
procedures. In addition, the procedures have to be followed regardless of the number 
of	proposed	retrenchments,	meaning	that	even	if	only	one	employee	is	to	be	retrenched	
the procedures set out in Section 189 have to be followed. As Van Niekerk highlights 
(2007: 26), this can be very impractical in, for example, the dismissal of a domestic 
worker.
In the 2002 amendment to the LRA, Section 189A was added, which to a certain 
extent recognises the difficulties SMMEs face by excluding them from Section 189A. 
0
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Section 189A is only applicable to employers with more than 50 workers. In addition, 
it	only	applies	when	the	number	of	retrenchments	during	a	year	is	more	than	a	certain	




A number of problems have, however, been identified with Section 189A. Roskam 
(2007: 19) states that both union members and employees find the section difficult 
to understand. The different threshold requirements for different size employers are 
also difficult to justify.	If	workers	choose	to	strike	about	the	substantive	fairness	of	the	
retrenchment under Section 189A and the matter appears before the Labour Court, 
different tests apply than in the case of SMMEs who fall under Section 189 only. 
Roskam (2007: 20) argues that all businesses should be treated equally with regard 
to	the	test	of	substantive	fairness	and	that	workers	at	small	businesses	should	also	be	
allowed to strike over the operational decision that resulted in the retrenchments.
International standards, as set by ILO Convention No. 158, allows for requirements of 
notification and consultation to be limited to when the proposed number of workers to 
be retrenched is above a certain threshold (Van Niekerk, 2007: 25). It has therefore 
been suggested that Section 189 be amended to limit the requirements of notification 
and	consultation	when	less	than	a	certain	number	of	employees	are	to	be	retrenched	
in a certain time period (Van Niekerk, 2007: 27). In addition, it has also been suggested 
that SMMEs should be excluded from the more complex and cumbersome procedures 
required by the LRA when retrenching employees (Cheadle, 2006: 30).
Finally, the Code of Good Practice on Dismissals for Operational Requirements currently 
does not add anything to the guidelines in the LRA itself. The development of a new 
code	has	been	proposed	which	would	set	out	more	clearly	the	procedures	an	employer	
should	follow	when	he	wants	to	retrench	workers	and	a	special	section	dealing	with	(a	
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more simplified) process to be followed by SMMEs (and also households employing 
domestic workers) (Roskam, 2007: 21). Cheadle (2006: 30) has gone a step further 




The level of protection that workers should enjoy during the probation period is currently 
a much debated issue. Many maintain that a probation period is critical to assess if an 
employee is suited to the particular workplace. It has, however, been argued that the 
difficulty of firing employees during the probation period is acting as a barrier to job 
creation. In other words, if it becomes easier to fire people during the probation period, 
employers may be encouraged to hire more workers. There is, however, no evidence 
to support this claim. All parties agree, however, that empirical research is required to 
establish	 if	 there	 is	actually	a	 link	between	reduced	protection	during	probation	and	
employment creation. The claim that a reduction in protection during the probation 
period will lead to employers hiring more workers should be empirically tested. Those 
opposed	 to	 reducing	protection	during	probation,	have	argued	 that	 less	protection	
during	 the	probation	period	may	be	abused	by	unscrupulous	employers,	who	may	
constantly	dismiss	workers	during	the	probation	period	because	it	 is	relatively	easy	to	
do. Some labour law experts have, however, suggested that this particular issue is not 
really	a	major	problem	in	the	workplace,	but	rather	being	perceived as a major problem. 
More research may be required here as experiences may differ across sectors or by 
type of employment. It is also important to evaluate this issue against international 
evidence	–	 it	has	been	observed	that	most	countries	have	moved	towards	removing	
some or all of the protections against dismissal during an initial “trial” period (Roskam, 
2007: 24; Van Niekerk, 2007: 9). 
The LRA includes “unfair conduct by the employer relating to …probation” as one 
of	 the	unfair	 labour	practices,	while	guidelines	 for	probation	(including	 the	provision	
of appropriate evaluation, training, instruction and guidance during this period) and 
dismissal during probation are set out in the Code of Good Practice:  Dismissal (RSA, 
1995). The Code only allows for dismissal during probation on the grounds of poor 
performance	and	not	 incompatibility	or	unsuitability	 in	 the	workplace	(Cheadle,	2006:	

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19). The only “leniency” is that the Code states that the reason for dismissal during 
the probation period may be “less compelling” than in the case of dismissals after the 
completion of probation (LRS, 1995). In other words, it is slightly easier to dismiss 
a worker for poor performance during probation than after completion of this period. 
However,	 if	an	employee	 is	dismissed	for	misconduct	or	 incapacity	during	probation,	
the standards are not relaxed and all the requirements and procedures apply as if the 
employee has already completed the probationary period (Van Niekerk, 2007: 17). 
As Cheadle (2006: 20) highlights, employers may side-step the issue of probation by 
entering into a fixed-term contract for a short period. If the employee is not suitable to 
or	compatible	with	the	workplace,	the	contract	will	simply	not	be	renewed	at	the	end	of	
the period. 
A solution that has been offered to address the issues around probation is the 
introduction of a “qualifying period” where all the protections against ordinary 
unfair	dismissals	 (except	of	course	 for	 reasons	 that	are	automatically	unfair	such	
as discrimination and victimisation) do not apply (Cheadle, 2006: 20; Van Niekerk, 
2007: 17,18). During this period, employers will be able to dismiss workers for poor 
performance or unsuitability without the normal protection. In order to prevent abuse, 
the qualifying period should take into account all previous periods of service with the 
employer or a related employer. This means that an employer will not be able to appoint 
a worker for a qualifying period if that worker has already completed such a period 
with	the	same	employer	 in	a	different	position	or	with	a	different	employer	 in	a	similar	
position. The length of qualifying periods can be changed via collective agreements, 
sectoral determinations and ministerial determinations. Van Niekerk (2007: 18) has 
suggested that qualifying periods can co-exist with probationary periods, with statutory 
qualifying periods and probation regulated by contract, and protection against abuse 
regulated by statutory and contractual remedies respectively. 
 3.3 Recruitment and Hiring
Current	 labour	 legislation	does	not	 regulate	 the	 recruitment	and	hiring	practices	of	
employers,	with	 three	notable	exceptions	which	are	 informed	by	 the	constitutional	
obligations on the employer (Cheadle, 2006: 16, 17). The first exception relates to 
unfair discrimination under the Employment Equity Act with provision for judicial 
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and administrative reviews. The second exception is the judicial review of employer 
decisions in relation to victimisation. The final exception is the judicial review under 
administrative law when hiring and recruitment takes place in the public service.
If an employer is found in breach of the Employment Equity Act, they will be subject to 
an	administrative	 investigation	and	 if	 found	guilty	will	be	subject	 to	an	administrative	
fine. The worker, who was subject to the discrimination, can sue the employer for 
damages, in the form of financial compensation. Cheadle, (2007: 17) has suggested 
that an amendment to the Employment Equity Act may be required to clarify that the 
victim can only sue for financial damages and not reinstatement. In terms of the right 
not to be victimised for one’s trade union affiliation and beliefs, Cheadle as well Roskam 




The final exception relates to recruitment and hiring in the public service.  The State is 
required to comply with the basic values and principles governing public administration 
and at present challenges to these decisions are considered under administrative law. 
As a result, the normal remedy is to undo the unfair administrative action and not to pay 
damages. Cheadle argues that this remedy is unnecessary as public service employees 
now fall under the LRA.
 3.4  Residual Unfair Labour Practices
The LRA and Code of Good Practice provide comprehensive guidelines for the 
procedures	to	be	followed	as	well	as	the	remedies	(that	 is,	 the	compensation	options	
available to employees who have been found to be unfairly treated) for unfair dismissals 
– both for dismissals for misconduct, incapacity and for retrenchments. The LRA does 
not	provide	such	comprehensive	guidelines	when	it	comes	to	what	 labour	 law	experts	
define as “residual” unfair labour practices. Residual unfair labour practices refer to 
unfair treatment in relation to the following:  promotion, demotion, training, benefits, 
discipline	short	of	dismissal,	suspension,	and	failure	to	reinstate	or	re-employ	a	former	
employee in terms of an agreement or contract (RSA, 1995; Cheadle, 2006: 14). 
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Labour lawyers generally agree that the current definition in the LRA of what constitutes 
an unfair labour practice should be reconsidered. They argue that the LRA establishes 
the right to equality and the right to freedom of association. Any infringements of these 
rights can be dealt with under the LRA or individual contracts of employment. This 
means	 that	when	an	employee	 is	being	 treated	unfairly	with	 regard	 to	promotion,	
demotion, training, benefits, discipline shore of dismissal, suspension and failure to 
reinstate or re-employ, there may be sufficient options available to the employee under 
the LRA or the individual employment contracts to address and remedy the unfair 
treatment. Hence, this suggests that some of the specific remedies for unfair labour 
practices in the LRA may be unnecessary (Cheadle, 2006; Van Niekerk, 2007). Experts, 
however,	disagree	about	how	to	address	these	issues	and	while	some	suggest	that	the	
reference to unfair labour practices should be removed completely from the LRA, others 
prefer	that	 they	be	replaced	with	clear	statutory	guidelines	to	be	followed	when	unfair	
treatment is suspected. In the sections below we consider each of these unfair labour 
practices separately, highlighting the current challenges and possible solutions.
3.4.1 Promotion
It	has	been	suggested	that	the	decision	to	promote	a	worker	 is	similar	to	the	decision	
to hire a worker in the sense that they can both be considered “appointments” (see 
Cheadle, 2006: 21 & Roskam, 2007: 26). There is, however, some disagreement 
over how the issue of promotion should be addressed. Some experts propose that 
promotions should be deleted as an unfair labour practice in the LRA (Cheadle, 
2006: 21; Van Niekerk, 2007: 32), and that intervention should only be allowed  under 
the	same	circumstances	applicable	 to	hiring	practices,	 that	 is,	 in	 the	event	of	unfair	
discrimination or victimisation. The opposing argument is that promotion is critically 
important because of the link to career development. If promotion is scrapped as 
an	unfair	 labour	practice,	and	 the	effected	employee	 is	not	covered	by	a	collective	
agreement, there will be no suitable process for dealing with a dispute about promotion. 
If	 there	 is	no	statutory	guideline,	 it	may	also	be	more	difficult	 for	 trade	unions	 to	
negotiate on promotions in collective agreements (Roskam, 2006: 28).
Currently,	 the	decision	 to	promote	an	employee	 in	 the	public	service	 is	considered	
to be an administrative action and administrative law (specifically the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act No 3 (PAJA)) applies when unfair treatment is suspected. 
It	has	been	suggested	 that	promotions	 in	 the	public	service	should	not	be	subject	
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to review under PAJA, but rather be dealt with under the LRA as is the case with 
private sector promotions. In addition it has been suggested that in order to address 
corruption and poor service delivery in the public service, the Public Service Act should 
be amended to provide remedies specifically for corrupt and incompetent appointments 
in the public service (Cheadle, 2006: 22 & Roskam, 2006: 27).
3.4.2 Demotion
A demotion can take place in three instances. Firstly, it can be a disciplinary measure; 
secondly,	it	can	be	an	alternative	to	dismissal	for	incapacity;	and	thirdly,	it	can	be	used	
as an alternative to retrenchment (Cheadle, 2006: 22). The argument for removing 
demotion as an unfair labour practice is relatively simple. In all three instances identified 
above, an employee can only be demoted if he or she agrees to it. If the employee 
does	not	agree	to	the	demotion,	and	the	employer	goes	ahead	with	the	demotion,	it	is	
a breach of the contract of employment. The employee can therefore sue for breach 
of contract or unfair constructive dismissal (Cheadle, 2006: 23; Roskam, 2007: 28). In 
terms of the BCEA, the Labour Courts have the jurisdiction to deal with the contractual 
disputes (Van Niekerk, 2007: 32).
Roskam (2007: 28,29), however, highlights a few flaws in the previous argument. If 
an	employee	 is	demoted,	he	may	not	perceive	 it	as	a	dismissal	and	may	not	realise	
that	he	can	challenge	the	demotion	in	the	same	way	as	he	would	have	challenged	an	
unfair constructive dismissal. If the demotion is deleted as an unfair labour practice, 
new guidelines should be provided on how employees can challenge a demotion. In 
addition,	if	a	disciplinary	code	allows	for	demotion	as	a	disciplinary	measure	it	does	not	
mean	that	an	employee	consented	to	demotion	if	he	is	found	guilty	of	misconduct	at	a	




There appears to be general agreement that given the protection of fundamental rights 
in the LRA and the Employment Equity Act, as well as the provisions of the Skills 
Development Act, there is no need to include training in the definition of unfair labour 
practices (Cheadle, 2006: 21; Van Niekerk, 2007: 31).
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A benefit is a term of service and is the only term of service included in the definition 
of unfair labour practice. The fairness of terms and conditions of employment is not 
normally	 judged	by	the	courts	and	fair	standards	are	generally	set	 through	contracts,	
collective	bargaining	and	 legislation,	with	 collective	bargaining	being	 the	primary	
mechanism (Cheadle, 2006: 31).
The Labour Court has limited the interpretation of unfair labour practice in relation to 
benefits to only refer to the unfair treatment of an employee who has the right to a 
benefit in terms of an existing contract or collective agreement. The dispute cannot be 
about introducing the right to a benefit. This means that if an employee’s contract does 
not provide for a benefit, but he feels that he is entitled to one, he is not allowed to 
claim that he is being unfairly treated. Legal experts have argued that unfair treatment 
in terms of benefits should be excluded from the definition of unfair labour practice. The 
reason for this is that if the provision of a benefit is included in the employment contract 
or	negotiated	as	part	of	a	collective	agreement,	the	contract	or	collective	agreement	will	
provide	the	employee	with	 the	process	to	be	followed	and	possible	solutions	 if	unfair	
treatment is experienced (Cheadle, 2006: 31, 32; Van Niekerk, 2007: 33).  
In terms of creating a right to a benefit (that is, the introduction of a new benefit), this 
should be done via collective bargaining. Roskam (2007: 30), however, argues that 
this	 is	not	always	 the	best	 remedy	 for	 resolving	disputes	about	 the	 introduction	of	
new benefits. An example is the case where an employer has the discretion to grant 
a benefit but chooses not to and the reason for not granting the benefit appears to be 
completely	irrational	and	cannot	be	connected	to	discrimination	in	terms	of	race	and	or	
gender. Bargaining or strike action may not be appropriate in such a case and workers 
should have the option of taking their grievances to the CCMA. The solution may be 
to provide guidelines in the LRA or Code of Good Practice on the boundaries of unfair 
conduct relating to the provision of benefits. 
3.4.4 Discipline Short of Dismissal
Discipline	short	of	dismissal	 refers	 to	 the	power	of	 the	employer	 to	discipline	 in	a	
manner other than a dismissal. Warnings are the most common form of discipline and 
the	argument	 for	scrapping	discipline	short	of	dismissal	as	an	unfair	 labour	practice	
is based on the fact that these actions are mostly warnings. If a warning forms part of 
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a sequence of events that eventually results in a dismissal, the fairness of the earlier 
warning and the subsequent dismissal will be evaluated under the test of fairness set 
out in the guidelines for dismissals (Cheadle, 2006: 24; Van Niekerk, 2007: 33).
Scrapping	discipline	short	of	dismissal	as	an	unfair	 labour	practice	can,	however	 it	 is	
argued, create certain problems. The affected employee may not have an opportunity 
to state his/her case, in other words the procedure will not be fair. Further problems 
relate to the subsequent impact of a warning. If an employee loses a promotion or does 
not	get	a	bonus	or	salary	increase	because	of	a	disciplinary	record,	the	employee	does	
not have the opportunity to challenge the earlier warning and its subsequent impact 
(Roskam, 2007: 31, 32).
3.4.5 Suspension
There is general consensus that widespread abuse of suspension occurs and this is 
a	particularly	common	occurrence	in	the	public	sector,	where	suspensions	have	been	
known	to	last	for	extended	periods	of	time	(Cheadle,	2006:	24;	Roskam,	2007:	32;	Van	
Niekerk, 2007: 34). There is also agreement that suspension as a form of discipline is 
not problematic. This can only happen with the employee’s consent and if the employee 
refuses and is subsequently dismissed the remedies for unfair dismissal will apply. 
Suspension pending disciplinary action is the problematic issue and has to be reviewed. 
The rationale is to suspend an employee in order to prevent him/her to interfere in 
the	 investigation	prior	 to	a	hearing	 in	 the	case	of	misconduct	or	prevent	him/her	 to	
repeat the misconduct. This is extremely unfair to the employee and can damage their 
reputation and career development. The proposed solution is the creation of a statutory 
obligation	 to	 limit	 the	 time-period	of	 investigations	and	to	make	disciplinary	hearings	
more efficient. In the public sector in particular, steps have to be taken to speed up 
the	process	and	disciplinary	hearings	should	 ideally	be	conducted	by	an	 independent	
institution. There is general agreement that this is the one aspect of unfair labour 
practice that has to be addressed urgently and that reform of the regulation is required 
here to particularly address the abuse of suspension in the public sector. 
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3.4.6 Summary  
There is general consensus that the interpretation of procedural fairness (that is, the 
procedure to be followed) when dismissing workers for misconduct or incapacity is 
problematic,	with	employers	generally	following	pre-dismissal	processes	that	are	much	
more complex than actually required by the law. In addition, it has been suggested that 
managers and skilled workers should be excluded from the laws on unfair dismissal. An 
earnings threshold, similar to the one used in the BCEA,6	may	be	an	appropriate	way	
to identify who should fall outside the ambit of the dismissal laws. When it comes to 
retrenchments, it has been suggested that the requirements with regard to notification 
can be limited when less than a particular number of workers is retrenched. 
One of the key issues that all law experts agree on is that the Code of Good Practice 
for	dismissal	 for	misconduct,	 incapacity	as	well	as	retrenchments,	should	urgently	be	
updated. Experts differ on how SMMEs should be treated, with some suggesting that 
they should be excluded from all legal requirements in relation to dismissals, while 
others feel that a separate Code of Good Practice should be drawn up for SMMEs. 
While	probation	appears	to	be	a	critical	issue,	it	has	been	found	that	this	is	not	the	case	
in practice and it has been suggested that the introduction of a “qualifying period” may 
be a way to deal with the current challenges around probation.
There is general agreement that the definition of what constitutes an unfair labour 
practice should be reviewed. Labour law experts do not, however, agree on how this 
should be done. Some suggest that all the unfair labour practices should be removed 
from the LRA, except suspension, while others prefer adding guidelines to the LRA 
or drawing up a separate Code of Good Practice to deal with unfair labour practices. 
Suspension pending disciplinary action is, however, very problematic, and requires 
immediate review, particularly given the abuse of suspension in the public sector. 
	 According	to	the	Basic	Conditions	of	Employment	Act,	no	7	of	997,	the	Regulation	of	Working	Time	does	not	apply	
to		employees	earning	more	than	R49	7,	before	deductions,	per	annum	(RSA,	2008).
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 4. Labour Market Institutions
The extent to which the institutional environment often reinforces or hinders legislative 
provisions, is often under-appreciated in debates around labour market regulation. In 
most economies, institutions govern and manage the labour market. These include 
employer	and	employee	organisations;	 the	courts	of	 law	 including	specialist	courts;	
institutions	 of	 dispute	 resolution;	 ministries	 of	 labour	 or	 employment;	 collective	
bargaining institutions; tripartite institutions and so on. These institutions will be 
differentially	resourced	in	human	and	physical	terms;	will	yield	contrasting	performances	
according	to	pre-set	objectives;	will	have	different	governance	structures,	parameters	of	
influence and ultimately power within the society and so on. Simply put, these range of 
factors,	all	of	which	are	time	and	context-dependent,	can	and	will	 fundamentally	alter	
the	manner	in	which	labour	regulatory	provisions	impact	on	the	economy
4.1 Bargaining Councils 
Bargaining councils (known as industrial councils before 1995) are the primary 
institutions	 involved	 in	 the	 statutory	 system	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 and	 wage	
determination in the South African labour market. Both trade unions and bargaining 
councils have been claimed to be contributing to inefficiencies in the labour market. 
The extensions of wage agreements to non-bargaining council members and non-union 
members	are	deemed	to	be	particularly	problematic	and	it	has	been	argued	that	these	
extensions	place	unnecessary	burdens	on	small	and	new	businesses	and	contributes	
to the high unemployment rate in the country (Bhorat, van der Westhuizen & Goga, 
2007: 1).
The LRA provides the legislative framework for the establishment of bargaining councils. 
In	 terms	of	 the	 legislation,	one	or	more	 registered	 trade	unions	and	one	or	more	
registered employers’ organisations may establish a bargaining council for a sector 
and/or geographical area. Worker interests are therefore represented at a bargaining 
council by the party trade unions. The Act also provides for the State to be a party to 
any	bargaining	council	if	it	is	an	employer	in	the	sector	and	area	in	which	the	bargaining	
council is established (RSA, 1995: 22). In addition, the LRA prescribes the functions 
and	powers	of	bargaining	councils	which	amongst	others,	 include	the	concluding	and	
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enforcing of collective agreements and certain dispute resolution functions (RSA, 1995: 
22, 23).
As noted above, the LRA sets out the procedures that have to be followed in order 
to have a collective agreement extended to non-bargaining council members. This 
includes that the Minister of Labour has to be satisfied that the trade unions whose 
members	constitute	 the	majority	of	 the	members	of	 the	party	 trade	unions,	and	 the	
party	employer	organisations	 that	employ	 the	majority	of	workers,	voted	 in	 favour	of	
the extension. A collective agreement is extended by publishing it in the Government 
Gazette.
One of the main criticisms levelled against the extension of bargaining council 
agreements	 is	 that	 large	 firms	 dominate	 the	 employer	 party	 bargaining	 during	
negotiations. These agreements (via the extensions) are then imposed on parties that 
were not involved in the negotiations. In practice, this has the effect of disproportionately 
excluding SMMEs.  The extension to non-parties was the subject of fierce debate in 
the mid-1990s in terms of the unintended consequence it ostensibly had in increasing 
regulatory oversight and labour costs for SMMEs. The aim of the requirements in the 
LRA is to ensure that representivity thresholds are met before an agreement can be 
extended and that SMMEs are adequately represented on councils (Godfrey et al, 
2006:  1). While it is generally difficult to accurately estimate the share of workers 
covered by extensions of bargaining council agreements, Godfrey et al. (2006: 24) have 
found	that	of	 the	estimated	32,6	percent	of	 formally	employed	workers	(with	 the	total	
excluding all Managers and Professionals in the private sector) covered by bargaining 
councils, only 4,6 percent were covered by extensions to agreements in 2004. In other 
words,	extended	bargaining	council	agreements	covered	a	very	small	share	of	 the	
labour force. This suggests that the extension to non-parties as a source of inefficiency 
in the labour market may be overstated. Put differently, the evidence that non-parties 
to the main bargaining council agreement suffer as a consequence of the automatic 
extension clause is not particularly strong.
The LRA also requires the constitution of a bargaining council to describe the 
procedures	 to	be	 followed	 for	a	company	 to	obtain	exemption	 from	some	or	all	 the	
clauses of an agreement. In order to comply with this, most of the councils have 
developed criteria for evaluating requests for exemptions as well as established 
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independent bodies to hear appeals when an exemption has been denied. The criteria 
are usually published in their collective agreements. The agreements can include up to 
eight	or	nine	criteria	without	any	indication,	though,	of	the	weight	of	the	criteria	when	an	
application for exemption is considered (Godfrey et al, 2006). This exemption system is 
the most important way in which the legislation accommodates SMMEs who may not be 
able to comply with the requirements of bargaining council agreements. Both employer 
parties	and	employers	who	are	not	parties	(and	therefore	covered	by	the	extension	of	
an agreement) can apply for exemptions (Godfrey et al, 2006:  65).
Godfrey et al (2006: 71-79) examined data on exemptions from 17 bargaining councils 
for 2000, 2002 and 2004. They found that for those years, between 72 percent and 
78	percent	of	applications	 for	exemptions	were	granted	–	either	 in	 full,	partially	or	
conditionally. The majority of applications were granted in full. They compared these 
results with data obtained from the DoL for 2003 and 2004. The DoL data covers 
44	councils	 in	2003	and	37	councils	 in	2004	and	shows	that	 in	almost	80	percent	of	
applications, exemptions are granted. This reinforces the view that the notion that the 
extensions-exemptions	clauses	within	 the	regulatory	environment	cannot	 legitimately	
be viewed as problematic in the domestic labour market.
Bhorat, Van der Westhuizen and Goga (2007) investigated the role of bargaining 
councils in wage formation in the South African labour market in 1995 and 2005. The 
first	step	was	 to	estimate	 the	number	of	workers	 that	were	covered	by	bargaining	
council agreements in those two years. Figures show that only about 15 percent of 
formally employed workers were members of bargaining councils in 1995. While this 
figure doubled to an estimated 32 percent in 2005, this still meant that less than a third 
of the formally employed were covered by bargaining councils. (The figure for 2005 
compares well with Godfrey et al‘s estimated bargaining council coverage of 32,6 
percent for 2004.)  In 2005, there were 48 bargaining councils, including the public 
sector councils. The councils vary from large, well organised national councils to very 
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Closer	 inspection	of	 the	 increase	 in	bargaining	council	membership	between	1995	
and	2005	revealed	that	is	was	almost	entirely	driven	by	the	rapid	rise	in	the	bargaining	
council system for the public sector. The establishment of the Private Sector Co-
ordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) meant that all non-managers (and even 
some levels of management) in the public sector were covered by wage agreements 
concluded in the PSCBC. In the private sector, however, bargaining councils have at 
best stagnated and at worse declined between 1995 and 2005. Despite aggregate 
employment growth in sectors such as Construction and Trade, bargaining council 
membership has not expanded accordingly. The only notable growth in bargaining 
council coverage was in the State Owned Enterprise-related sectors. Overall, the 
number	of	private	sector	workers	covered	by	bargaining	council	agreements	remained	
relatively stable at around one million. Simply put, bargaining council membership in 
the first decade of democracy has been characterised by an erosion of private sector 
bargaining	council	membership	on	the	one	hand	and	the	rapid	rise	of	 this	system	of	
bargaining in the public sector.
At first glance, there did not appear to have been any significant remunerative 
advantage	associated	with	bargaining	council	membership	in	either	1995	or	2005	when	
mean earnings were compared according to race and gender. Closer inspection of the 
mean earnings of bargaining council members in 2005, however, revealed significant 
wage advantages associated with membership of the PSCBC. At the aggregate level, 
public	sector	bargaining	council	members	not	only	earned	more	than	the	private	sector	
bargaining	council	counterparts,	but	also	on	average	more	 than	workers	outside	 the	
bargaining council system. This trend was observed for males and females, African and 
Coloured workers, as well as when controlling for occupations. 
A multivariate analysis was performed to attempt to isolate the specific impact of the 
membership of a bargaining council, union or both on earnings. The results from this 
analysis confirmed the tentative conclusions from the initial comparison of the level 
of mean wages. Hence, in 1995, workers in the bargaining council-non-union cohort 
only	enjoyed	a	small	wage	premium	relative	to	workers	who	were	not	covered	by	any	
institutional wage agreement. Workers in the union-bargaining council cohort did not 
enjoy any significant benefit in terms of average earnings. The establishment of the 
PSCBC, however, led to significantly higher wages being associated with public sector 
bargaining council membership in 2005. The decline of the private sector bargaining 
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council	system,	 in	turn,	resulted	 in	the	membership	of	 these	councils	not	offering	any	
wage benefit relative to their members who were not unionised – a contrast from a 
decade earlier. Workers who belonged to both a union and bargaining council in 2005 
did, however, enjoy relatively higher wages. Union membership was associated with 
relatively higher earnings both in 1995 and 2005. 
Overall, the evidence presented above suggests extensions of bargaining council 
agreements	to	non-parties	to	the	main	agreement	account	for	a	very	small	share	of	the	
formal labour force in South Africa. In addition, the exemption system appears to be 
working well, providing SMMEs with the opportunity to be exempted from some or all of 
the clauses of agreements. It was further shown that the increase in bargaining council 
membership	since	1995	has	been	driven	by	 the	establishment	of	 the	PSCBC,	while	
private sectors councils appear to be in decline. Finally, in 2005, only public sector 
bargaining	council	membership	was	associated	with	 relatively	higher	wages,	while	
workers belonging to private sector councils did not enjoy any wage benefits. There 
is therefore no evidence that bargaining councils (particularly in the private sector) 
contribute to inefficiencies in the labour market. The fact that the bargaining council 
system	appears	 to	be	 in	decline,	does,	however,	suggest	 that	 the	current	system	of	
collective	bargaining	should	be	investigated	with	an	eye	on	possible	policy	interventions	
to improve the system of collective bargaining.
The LRA provides for the right and not the duty to bargaining. This means that the 
LRA provides for a voluntary collective bargaining system, but includes incentives 
(particularly the ability of a bargaining council to extend its agreements) to encourage 
both unions and employers to participate in collective bargaining. In addition, the aim 
of the provisions in the LRA was to strengthen and expand the coverage of sector 
level collective bargaining (Cheadle, 2006: 33; Godrey et.al, 2007). The idea was that 
bargaining	councils	would	set	 the	framework	for	wages	and	working	conditions	at	 the	
sectoral	level,	while	additional	bargaining	can	take	place	at	the	workplace	or	enterprise	
level (Cheadle, 2006: 40).
The anticipated expansion of the collective bargaining system did not, however, 
materialise. The bargaining council system has remained strong in sectors where there 
is a tradition of collective bargaining and trade union organisation. Overall, however, 
bargaining	council	coverage	remains	fragmented	(as	evidenced	by	the	proportionally	
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small share of workers covered by agreements) and most councils are not truly sectoral 
(Cheadle, 2006: 37).
Labour	 law	experts	agree	 that	 imposing	a	duty	 to	bargaining	 is	not	 the	preferred	
solution,	but	 instead	have	highlighted	the	need	for	 the	Department	of	Labour	 to	play	
a more pro-active role in promoting collective bargaining at the sectoral level. Specific 
suggestions	 include	that	 the	Department	should	revisit	 the	mechanism	for	extending	
collective	agreements,	with	one	option	being	 that	 less	emphasis	should	be	put	on	
representivity	and	that	an	agreement	should	rather	be	judged	on	how	well	it	is	aligned	
with government’s labour market policy. Others have proposed the development of 
specific programmes to support and assist bargaining councils, in order to disseminate 
best practices and to co-ordinate systems and resources (Cheadle, 2006: 41, Godfrey 
et al, 2007: 104). The formation of bargaining councils in sectors which have not 
traditionally engaged in collective bargaining should also be encouraged.
Finally,	 it	has	been	suggested	 that	sector	 level	collective	bargaining	 is	 the	only	way	
in	which	atypical	employees	(that	 is,	 those	 in	casual	or	 informal	employment	as	well	
as the self-employed) can be afforded some protection in the labour market (Cheadle 
2006: 42, Godfrey et al, 2007: 105). This means that sector level bargaining should 
take into account the specific needs of these workers and it also means that specific 
measures	will	have	to	be	developed	to	 involve	unorganised	workers	 in	the	bargaining	
process. Some international examples exist of where trade unions and organisations 
active	in	the	informal	economy	have	developed	models	for	collective	bargaining	in	the	
informal economy (See Godfrey et al, 2007: 105).
4.2 CCMA
The 1995 LRA created the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
(CCMA) as one of the main institutions to deal with labour disputes. In addition, the 
LRA prescribes the process that should be followed by the CCMA in resolving labour 
disputes. The CCMA was given the authority to provide accreditation to bargaining 
councils and privates agencies to perform dispute resolution functions (RSA, 1995). 
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The	Process	of	Dispute	Resolution
Prior to discussing the operations of the CCMA, we briefly review the structure of 
the dispute resolution process in South Africa generally and the role of the CCMA 
specifically. Labour disputes can be classified into disputes of rights and disputes 
of interests, with disputes of interest being about new rights.8 The type of dispute 
determines the dispute resolute technique to be followed. The LRA provides for the 
determination	of	 disputes	of	 rights	 through	adjudication	by	 the	Labour	Courts	 or	
arbitration either by the CCMA, private dispute resolution institutions or Bargaining 
Councils. In the case of a dispute about rights, the first stage of dispute resolution is 
conciliation,	which	involves	a	neutral	or	acceptable	third	party	assisting	the	two	sides	in	
coming to a mutually acceptable and binding solution. If conciliation is not successful, 
the case proceeds to arbitration. Issues that are more complex or that can affect public 
policy	generally	go	straight	to	adjudication	in	the	Labour	Courts,	while	other	issues	go	
to arbitration. During arbitration, the dispute is settled by a neutral third party, with the 
arbitrator’s decision final and binding. The LRA allows for the Labour Courts to review 
the outcomes of arbitrations under certain conditions. Disputes of interest are also first 
conciliated. If conciliation is not successful, the next phase may be industrial action (a 
strike or a lock-out), but this is not a common occurrence (Bhorat et al, 2007: 3, 4). 
In 2002, the amendments to the LRA included two specific reforms that were aimed 
at speeding up the resolution of dismissal disputes. These are the “pre-dismissal” 
arbitration	which,	 if	both	parties	agree	 to	 the	process,	eliminates	 the	need	 for	both	
an internal hearing and arbitration. The second reform is the introduction of the “con-
arb” process, which allows for arbitration to start immediately after an unsuccessful 
conciliation process, merging the two processes into one (Benjamin & Theron, 2007: 
37).
Dispute	Resolution	by	the	CCMA
As noted, the process of dispute resolution by the CCMA is regulated by the LRA, both 
in	terms	of	the	action	of	the	commissioners	and	the	prescription	of	time-periods	within	
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which certain actions have to take place. The LRA also requires the CCMA to conciliate 
and arbitrate disputes as quickly as possible. 
The first step in the dispute resolution process is the referral of the dispute to the CCMA 
by the employee who thinks he has been treated unfairly. This has to happen within 
30 days of the dismissal or within 90 days of the alleged unfair labour practice (RSA, 
1995).9 The first step is the “screening” of the case to determine if it falls within the 
jurisdiction of the CCMA (Levy & Venter, 2006: 24). If the correct referral process has 
been followed and the case falls under the CCMA’s jurisdiction, the CCMA will appoint 
a commissioner and the case will proceed to conciliation. No legal representation is 
allowed at conciliation and the CCMA commissioner determines the process to be 
followed during this stage. The LRA requires the commissioner to resolve the dispute 
within	30	days	of	referral	and	at	the	end	of	the	period,	the	commissioner	has	to	issue	a	
certificate stating if the dispute has been resolved or not (Bhorat et al, 2007: 4).   
If the dispute was not resolved the next step is arbitration. The CCMA appoints a 
commissioner (arbitrator) whose decision is final and binding. If the arbitrator finds 
in favour of the employee, the LRA suggests reinstatement as the preferred remedy, 
but an employer may be ordered to pay compensation (Levy & Venter, 2006: 16). No 
appeals	against	 these	decisions	are	allowed,	but	parties	may	approach	 the	Labour	
Court to review an arbitration award.    
The LRA requires the commissioner to select the most appropriate manner for the 
arbitration process in order to deal with the dispute fairly and quickly. The Act also 
requires the commissioner to use the minimum of legal formalities in dealing with the 
substantial merits of the case. Parties are allowed to give evidence, call witnesses, 
question the witnesses of the other party and address concluding arguments to the 
commissioner depending on the commissioner’s choice of format for the proceedings. 
The LRA allows for either party to be represented by a legal practitioner, company 
director or a representative of a trade union or employer organisation. Again this has 
to be agreed upon by both parties and authorised by the commissioner. It has been 
argued that the CCMA has not created proper rules relating to the right to representation 
9	 A	condonation	application	can	be	submitted	 in	 terms	of	 the	CCMA	rules,	which	means	that	 the	CCMA	considers	a	
referral	that	was	made	outside	the	specified	time	periods	(Levy	&	Venter,	200:	24).
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as	intended	by	the	2002	amendments	and	that	representation	is	unrestricted	as	a	result	
(Bhorat et al, 2007: 5). 
As mentioned before, the 2002 amendments created the “con-arb” process as an 
alternative option to dispute resolution. This basically means that conciliation and 
arbitration	 can	 take	place	as	one	process	with	 two	 steps	–	arbitration	will	 follow	
immediately if conciliation was unsuccessful.10 The purpose was to avoid the delay 
between the two separate processes and therefore reduce the cost (both financially 
and in terms of time) of the whole dispute resolution process. Again representation is 
only allowed at the arbitration phase (Bhorat et al, 2007: 5).
Before	 the	 introduction	of	 the	con-arb	process,	conciliation	accounted	 for	about	half	
of the determinative processes.11 After the introduction of the “con-arb” process, the 
share of “pure” conciliation cases declined, but if the “con-arb” cases that are resolved 
at	the	conciliation	stage	are	added	to	theses,	the	share	of	conciliation	cases	remained	
relatively stable between 2001/02 and 2005/06. The introduction of the “con-arb” 
process has had a similar impact on the total number of arbitration cases. Before the 
introduction of the “con-arb” process, the disputes concluded at the arbitration phase 
accounted for about 35 percent of cases. With the introduction of “con-arb”, this share 
declined, but when cases concluded at the arbitration phase of “con-arb” are included, 
the	share	of	arbitration	cases	remained	relatively	constant,	with	only	a	slight	 increase	
to about 40 percent in 2005/06. The remainder of cases can be broken down to pre-
conciliation (6,5 percent in 2005/06), in limine12 (8.2 percent in 2005/06), other and 
withdrawn (3.03 percent in 2005/06). (All calculations were done by Bhorat et al, (2007) 
using data from the Case Management System database)
It has been estimated that about 70 percent of the employed in South Africa fall under 
the jurisdiction of the CCMA, with the rest subject to dispute resolution by bargaining 
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the CCMA has to provide services to a relatively higher share of skilled formal sector 
employees. This is certainly true of the private sector, where private sector bargaining 
councils do not cover Managers and Professionals, while the PSCBC does cover 
Professionals and certain levels of Management. In addition, the CCMA is the only 
dispute resolution institution that covers (unskilled) domestic workers and agricultural 
workers, as well as the majority of elementary workers. As a result CCMA coverage is 
relatively higher at the two extremes of the skills spectrum.
Four main types of disputes are referred to the CCMA, namely disputes over unfair 
dismissals	 (which	 include	 the	 whole	 range	 of	 dismissals	 relating	 to	 misconduct,	
incapacity, pregnancy, redundancy, and constructive dismissals), unfair labour practices, 
disputes arising over mutual interests and disputes over severance pay. Bhorat et 
al (2007: 11) have shown that between 2001/02 and 2005/06, disputes about unfair 
dismissals accounted for about seventy percent of all referrals to the CCMA.
The efficiency of the CCMA has been the subject of much debate and a number of 
specific challenges have been identified. These include the following: 
•	 High	number	of	referrals
•	 Settlement	rates
•	 Time taken to resolve disputes  
•	 Too much emphasis on procedural fairness
•	 Relationship between the Labour Court and the CCMA
High	number	of	referrals
At the inception of the CCMA, it was estimated that it would have to deal with around 
30 000 cases a year. There is general agreement that this was a gross underestimation 
(Bhorat et al, 2007: 11; Van Niekerk, 2007: 39). During its first year of operation 
(1996/97), the CCMA only processed 2 917 cases. This increased to almost 70 000 in 
1997/98 and to just under 130 000 in 2005/06 (Bhorat et al, 2007, using the CCMA’s 
Case Management System Database (CMS) and Annual Reports). Given that the case 
load is so much larger than anticipated, it has caused major financial and administration 
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strain on the CCMA. The data has, however, shown that the case load has stabilised 
since 2002/03 and even declined slightly between 2004/05 and 2005/06. In addition, the 
data also suggests that the type of disputes referred to the CCMA as well as the shares 
of	referrals	by	economic	sector	and	region	have	remained	relatively	stable	since	the	
CCMA’s inception. These observed patterns should make future planning easier for the 
CCMA, but does not retract from the fact that in terms of human resources and funding 
the CCMA is not equipped to deal with the current (or future) caseload.
Statistics from the CCMA’s own database suggest that between 2001 and 2005, more 
than 30 percent of referrals were classified as “out of jurisdiction”, meaning that the 
subject of the dispute falls outside the jurisdiction of the CCMA or that the referral is 
incomplete.13		In	terms	of	 jurisdiction,	the	dispute	generally	should	have	been	referred	
to the Department of Labour or to an applicable bargaining council (Benjamin & Gruen, 
2006: 13). This represents a significant cost to the CCMA as these cases have to be 
screened before they can be rejected. In addition it places an administrative burden on 
the CCMA. On the positive side it does mean that inappropriate cases do not end up 
in conciliation or arbitration and cause congestion in the system (Benjamin & Gruen, 
2006: 16).
There is also the suggestion that the primary users of the CCMA are not necessarily 
those that were initially targeted. Levy and Venter (2006: 32) have shown that about 
40 percent of referrals to the CCMA in 2004/05 were from while collar workers in 
professional services, banking, parastatals, tourism and financial services. 
“Unorganised” workers accounted for about 58 percent of referrals. It has been 
suggested	that	other	bodies	should	take	on	dispute	resolution	functions	so	that	 those	
who were intended to use the CCMA (lower-level and unorganised workers) can be 
offered a better service (Roskam, 2007: 39). In line with this, the establishment of 
bargaining	councils	 in	well-organised	sectors	should	be	encouraged	 to	 relieve	 the	
burden on the CCMA where it comes to dispute resolution. While the LRA makes 
provision	 for	 the	accreditation	of	private	dispute	 resolution	services,	 this	has	not	
happened. CCMA should proceed, as a matter of urgency, with the accreditation of 
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workers should be encouraged to rather utilise these agencies (Roskam, 2007: 39). 
Labour	 law	consultants	can	also	play	a	role	 in	encouraging	skilled	workers	 to	rather	
approach these private agencies with their disputes.
In	bargaining	councils,	 the	dispute	resolution	function	 is	generally	performed	by	staff	
of the council of council staff together with outside commissioners. Bargaining councils 
have, however, complained that the subsidy provided by the CCMA is insufficient and 
as	a	result	 the	performance	of	 the	dispute	resolution	function	has	become	a	drain	on	
councils’ finance (Godfrey et al, 2007). 
It has been suggested, that in order to reduce the number of referrals, a filing fee or 
the presentation of security for costs should be introduced for certain cases. The idea 
is that this may restrict access to the CCMA in such a way that inappropriate cases will 
be filtered out (Van Niekerk, 2007: 47). This may however also impact on the number of 
legitimate cases referred to the CCMA, particularly by vulnerable workers who cannot 
afford such a fee.  
Settlement	Rates
The CCMA has its own comprehensive list of internal and statutory measures of 
efficiency. Outcomes are compared against targets on a monthly basis to measure 
the efficiency of each of the regional offices of the CCMA. The efficiency measures 
are	not	necessarily	comparable	over	 time	as	dispute	resolution	measures	adapt	and	
evolve and as a result the efficiency measures are adapted too. Efficiency targets are 
also revised regularly (Bhorat et al, 2007: 22). A review of all these measures since the 
inception of the CCMA is, as a result, very difficult and also falls outside the ambit of the 
paper. We therefore only highlight the most important efficiency parameters and their 
outcomes. One of these is the settlement rate, which the requirement that at least 70 
percent of the cases referred to the CCMA have to be resolved during the conciliation 
or arbitration process or withdrawn by the plaintiff (in other words “settled”). During the 
2003/04	to	2005/06	period	this	target	was	not	met,	with	the	settlement	rate	ranging	from	
56 to 62 percent (Bhorat et al, 2007: 22).
On the other hand it has been suggested that the CCMA commissioners may tend 
to settle cases too quickly in order to meet the settlement rate and other settlement 
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targets. As a result cases are settled without the underlying issues being addressed 
and resolved properly. This may point to a need to review the settlement rate as an 
efficiency target. 
Speed	of	the	processes
The CCMA has been criticised for not resolving disputes as quickly as intended. The 
LRA sets targets for the time period in which a dispute should be settled, with specific 
target days for the difference phases of the dispute resolution process. These statutory 
targets are also used by the CCMA itself to evaluate its internal efficiently.
The turnaround time between referral and activation refers to the time between when 
a case is referred to the CCMA and the requirement information is captured. In the 
majority	of	cases	 the	activation	date	 is	 the	same	as	 the	referral	date,	meaning	 that	
the turnaround time is zero. Delays result when information is missing in the referral 
and the applicant has to supply this information. Long delays do not necessarily reflect 
poorly on the efficiently of the CCMA as the client has to provide the information (Bhorat 
et al, 2007: 27). It does, however, add to the administrative burden of the CCMA.
In terms of conciliation, the LRA requires that no conciliation be conducted outside of 
the 30 day statutory period (that is, the requirement that conciliation has to take place 
within 30 days of referral of the case to the CCMA), unless both parties have agreed. 
The related efficiency measure is simply a count of the number of cases conducted 
outside the 30 days. Bhorat et al, (2007: 22) have shown that the target of zero cases 
was not achieved in the period 2003/04 to 2005/06. 
The efficiency target in terms of turnaround time for conciliations is that cases must be 
finalised within 30 days of activation of the case.14	Both	 in	2004/05	and	2005/06	this	
target	was	missed	with	 turnaround	times	actually	 increasing	over	 the	period	 from	33	
to 45 days (Bhorat et al, 2007: 23). Using the CCMA’s CMS data, Bhorat et al. (2007: 
34) calculated that the average conciliation (including con-arb cases concluded at the 
4	 This	efficiency	target	is	different	from	the	previous	target	but	both	follow	from	the	statutory	requirement	that	conciliation	
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conciliation phase) turnaround time was 36 days for the period 2001/02 to 2005/06.
The efficiency target for arbitrations requires that these cases must be finalised within 
60 days of the referral to arbitration.15 Again this target has continuously been missed, 
with	 the	estimated	average	 turnaround	 times	 for	arbitrations	between	2002/03	and	
2005/06 more than 100 days. The evidence does suggest that the situation has 
improved	dramatically	over	 the	period,	with	 the	turnaround	time	reduced	to	about	80	
days (Bhorat et al, 2007: 38). This, however, still implies that the average arbitration 
case takes about a third of the time longer than the target.
Another contributing factor to the delay in the turnover of cases is the number of in 
limine applications. An in limine application	refers	 to	 the	 legal	process	where	one	of	
the	parties	to	the	dispute	applies	to	have	the	case	dismissed	on	a	technical	point	that	
does not relate to the merits (facts) of the case (Benjamin & Gruen, 2006: 31). After a 
sharp	increase	between	2001/02	and	2002/03,	the	share	of	in limine cases	in	the	total	
caseload stabilised at around eight percent (Bhorat et al, 2007: 20). This, however, 
still amounts to a substantial number of cases every year. It also contributes to further 
delays	as	the	continuation	of	the	dispute	resolute	process	depends	on	the	outcome	of	
the	in limine application. 
The lack of human resources at the CCMA has been highlighted as particularly 
problematic. Work overload reduces the effectiveness of commissioners as they are 
required to conciliate and arbitrate three to six cases a day.  Due to the large number of 
conciliations	scheduled	for	each	commissioner	every	day,	commissioners	do	not	have	
enough	time	to	conciliate	cases	properly	and	therefore	do	not	have	the	time	to	address	
the causes and underlying issues of a dispute (Levy & Venter, 2006: 53). Although 
the	conciliation	process	is	mandatory,	legally	there	is	no	pressure	to	resolve	a	case	at	
this	stage	and	generally	neither	employees	nor	employers	are	eager	 to	settle	as	this	
phase. When either of the parties does not attend conciliation hearings, the matter is 
automatically referred to arbitration. It has been suggested that employees have the 
impression that the longer the process is drawn out, the bigger the financial award will 
be. In addition, parties to the dispute also regularly apply for postponements before 
	 This	means	the	date	from	which	the	case	was	referred	to	arbitration	–	and	not	the	date	of	the	initial	activation	of	the	
case.
DPRU Working Paper 09/136                                     Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen

or at hearings (Levy & Venter, 2006: 29). Some experts have suggested that CCMA 
commissioners	should	be	more	forceful	in	promoting	conciliation	as	the	preferred	stage	
to settle a case. 
The CCMA limits the number of cases any commissioner may postpone. The target 
in 2003/04 was one percent, but was increased to three and five percent respectively 
in 2004/05 and 2005/06. These targets were never reached, with postponements 
reaching about eight percent for each of the three years. The tendency for part-time 
commissioners	to	postpone	cases	has	been	raised	as	a	cause	for	concern	with	some	
suggesting	that	because	part-time	commissioners	work	on	a	contract/hourly	basis,	they	
postpone for financial reasons (Bhorat et al, 2007: 23). 
Over-emphasis	on	procedural	fairness
In Section 3.1 on unfair dismissals, the issues around procedural fairness were 
highlighted – specifically the fact that employers and labour law consultants continue 
to interpret the LRA’s requirements in a much stricter manner than was intended. There 
is a general perception that where it comes to procedural fairness, the CCMA also 
continues to “apply and demand procedural rights beyond those required by the Code 
of Good Practice” (Van Niekerk, 2007: 23; See also Levy & Venter, 2006: 38). Legal 
experts in this arena have noted that CCMA commissioners may benefit from guidance 
and training in this regard.
Impact	of	Labour	Court	decisions	on	the	CCMA
The Labour Court has a supervisory authority over the CCMA. The decisions made 
by the Labour Court are binding on the CCMA and the CCMA must fulfil its functions 
according to the way the Labour Court interprets the provisions of the LRA. In 
addition,	all	other	stakeholders,	 including	employers,	 trade	unions	and	labour	 lawyers	
and	consultants	have	 to	keep	up	 to	date	with	Labour	Court	decisions	as	 they	are	
handed down, as these provide guidance on how to interpret requirements of the LRA 
(Benjamin, 2006: 2). 
Benjamin (2006) reviewed the impact of the Labour Court case law on the arbitration 
processes conducted at the CCMA, specifically highlighting how the different views 
of	 labour	court	 judges	have	contributed	to	uncertainty	and	 inconsistency	 in	choosing	
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the basic format or procedure for arbitration hearings.16  As discussed earlier, the LRA 
leaves it up to the CCMA commissioner to decide on the format of the arbitration 
process, based on the Labour Court’s interpretation of the LRA’s requirements. The key 
requirement is that he/she should deal with the “substantial merits” of the disputes with 
the “minimum of legal formalities”. In addition, commissioners are also obliged to deal 
with the dispute “as quickly as possible”. In practice, these two obligations can be at 
odds with each other.   
In	order	 to	promote	 the	speedy	 resolution	of	disputes,	commissioners	are	allowed	
to “narrow the issues” (that is, limit the number of issues) to be dealt with during 
arbitration. The commissioner, however, has very little information prior to the start of 
the	arbitration	process	to	base	this	decision	on	and	in	practice	the	commissioner	may	
end up ignoring some of the key issues. The Labour Court provides no guidelines on 
how to deal with the problem. 
The Labour Court distinguishes between two main approaches an arbitrator can 
choose when conducting an arbitration hearing. An arbitrator can conduct hearings in 
an “adversarial” mode where the responsibility of questioning the witnesses is left in 
the hands of the parties and/or their representatives. Or an arbitrator can follow a more 
“inquisitorial” approach where he/she plays a more active role in uncovering the facts 
of the case. The Court does not allow a commissioner to change the format during 
the proceedings even if it will speed up the process and uncover more facts. This is 
very problematic if a commissioner has chosen an “adversarial” format and it becomes 
clear	during	the	proceedings	that	one	of	 the	parties	 is	not	successful	 in	presenting	all	
the relevant facts. The commissioner is then not allowed to intervene to ensure that 
the substantial merits of the case are dealt with. A situation like this can occur because 
there	are	no	guidelines	which	set	out	the	factors	a	commissioner	should	consider	when	
choosing the format for the hearing. 
Overall, the issues highlighted above suggest that the Labour Court has not been very 
successful in fulfilling its supervisory function and this has impacted not only on the 
efficiency of the CCMA, but on the dispute resolution process as a whole. In addition, 
the lack of clear guidance from Labour Court judgements makes it very difficult to 
	 Unless	otherwise	indicated,	this	sub-section	draws	on	the	discussion	in	Benjamin	(200).
DPRU Working Paper 09/136                                     Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen

for the CCMA to draw up guidelines that will assist commissioners in choosing the 
correct	format	for	hearings	and	also	assisting	them	to	make	sure	that	they	deal	with	the	
substantial merits of a case. 
4.3 Labour Courts
The Labour Courts (consisting of the Labour Court and the Labour Appeals Court) 
were the second set of new institutions created by the 1995 LRA specifically for the 
resolution and settlements for labour disputes. The Labour Court can hear contractual 
disputes or disputes under the Basic Conditions for Employment Act or the Employment 
Equity Act, without the dispute first being subject to conciliation. The Labour Court is 
also responsible for the review of arbitration awards issued by the CCMA (Benjamin, 
2006: 7). 
The Labour Court was officially established with the enactment of the LRA in 1996. 
Initially	 three	 full-time	 judges	were	appointed	 to	 the	court,	supplemented	by	acting	
judges. No new full-time judges have been appointed since 2002, and since 2006 
only two full-time judges have been serving on the bench of the Labour Court. As a 
result,	the	court	is	very	dependent	on	acting	judges	and	this	reliance	has	been	subject	
to substantial criticism (Benjamin, 2006: 7). In fact, one of the most severe problems 
currently facing the Labour Court is this reliance on acting judges.
The Labour Appeals Court (LAC) was established as the court of final instance in 
matters concerning the interpretation of the LRA and other matters within the jurisdiction 
of the Labour Court. The LAC was initially staffed by a full-time Judge President and a 
Deputy Judge President, but by 2006 the LAC only had a full-time Judge President, 
assisted	by	High	Court	judges	and	retired	judges	who	generally	only	serve	a	term	at	a	
time (Benjamin, 2006: 7, 8).  It was initially envisaged that the only matters with regard 
to which the LAC would not be the final court of appeal, would be constitutional issues, 
with the Constitutional Court as the final court of appeal. The Constitution, however, 
established the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) as the final court of appeals in all 
matters, except constitutional matters. The SCA has subsequently ruled that it is also 
the final court for appeals against the decisions of the LAC (Bhorat & Cheadle, 2007: 
16). This means that the SCA can overturn judgements from the LAC. 
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In	2003,	the	draft	Superior	Courts	Bill	proposed	that	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Labour	Court	
should	be	transferred	to	the	High	Court	where	its	functions	will	be	performed	by	judges	
taken from a list of judges with expertise in labour law. The Bill did not propose the 
establishment	of	a	specialised	Labour	Court,	but	rather	that	cases	should	be	heard	by	
judges selected on the basis of their labour law expertise. It was also proposed that the 
functions of the Labour Appeals Court be transferred to the Superior Court of Appeals. 
Both	business	and	 labour	 representatives	have	 registered	 their	objection	 to	 these	
proposals	and	the	feeling	is	that	the	integration	of	the	Labour	Courts	into	the	High	Court	
system will severely undermine the rights of both workers and employers. In addition 
the	knowledge	and	experience	associated	with	specialists	Labour	Courts	will	be	lost	if	
labour cases are heard in a general court. This issue, however, remains unresolved and 
the	uncertainty	has	stalled	the	appointment	of	additional	full-time	judges	to	the	Labour	
Courts (Benjamin, 2006: 9).
Reviews	of	Arbitrations
The LRA does not allow appeals against the outcomes of arbitrations. The rationale 
behind	this	was	to	avoid	the	high	costs	and	time	delays	that	are	usually	associated	with	
appeals. The LRA instead makes provision for the Labour Court to review arbitration 
awards. In the case of arbitration awards, a review must be brought within six weeks 
of	when	 the	award	was	made,	again	highlighting	 the	emphasis	on	speediness	 in	
arbitration cases. Labour Court judges are allowed to perform an appeal function and 
correct mistakes by CCMA arbitrators when required (Benjamin, 2006: 43). 
The CCMA has estimated that about 20 percent of arbitration awards are subject to 
reviews. It has, however, also estimated that only about 20 percent of reviews that are 
instituted are actually processed to the stage of a hearing. This is being interpreted to 
suggest	that	reviews	are	used	by	employers	to	delay	the	enforcement	of	awards	(that	
is, the payment of awards) to employees (Benjamin, 2006: 44). In reality, the review 
process causes major delays in the dispute resolution process. It is estimated that it 
takes on average 23 months to conclude a review and that only about a quarter of 
reviews which proceed to the Labour Court are successful. It is clear that the lengthy 
review	processes	run	counter	to	the	objective	that	 labour	disputes	should	be	resolved	
quickly.
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Review	proceedings	mostly	 take	place	without	 input	 from	the	relevant	commissioner	
or the CCMA. As a result, the decisions of the Labour Court do no engage with the 
practices and policies of the CCMA. In turn this impacts on the effectiveness of the 
supervisory role of the Labour Court on the activities of the CCMA (Benjamin, 2006: 
45). The urgent need is to update the Code of Good Practice:  Dismissal to present 
better and clearer guidelines to CCMA commissioners, particularly with regard to unfair 
dismissal cases, has again been highlighted. Updated guidelines will then (hopefully) 
reduce the number of reviews before the Labour Court.  Generally, it has also been 
suggested that closer links should be forged between the CCMA and the Labour Courts 
in order to make the whole dispute resolution process more efficient. 
The usefulness of the review process has been questioned and it has been suggested 
that it may be more appropriate to allow appeals against the decision of the CCMA in 
dismissal cases. The result will hopefully be a clearer body of Labour Court judgements 
which can be used as guidelines by the CCMA.
Currently	 there	are	no	statistics	available	on	reviews	by	the	Labour	Courts	and	it	has	
been	suggested	 that	a	case	management	database	similar	 to	 the	one	used	by	 the	
CCMA be developed to make it easier to evaluate the efficiency of the Labour Courts. 
Finally,	it	has	also	been	suggested	that	the	Rules	Board	of	the	Labour	Court	should	be	
convened to update the rules of the Court.
4.4 Summary
The evidence presented above disputes any claims that bargaining councils contribute 
to inefficiencies in the South African labour market. Rather, the balance of the evidence 
seems	to	suggest	 that	 the	key	 issue	 is	how	to	address	 the	current	 fragmented	state	
of	collective	bargaining	and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	envisaged	expansion	of	sector	 level	
bargaining did not occur. The promotion of sectoral collective bargaining and the 
formation of bargaining councils may have several possible positive outcomes. It has 
been	suggested	 that	 it	 is	 the	only	viable	way	 to	extend	protection	 to	atypical	 (and	
particularly vulnerable) employees such as informal sector workers, casual workers and 
the self-employed. Increasing financial support for the dispute resolution functions of 
bargaining councils will also relieve some of the pressures on the CCMA.
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The CCMA is faced by a much higher number or referrals than initially anticipated and 
the	accreditation	of	private	agencies	should	be	encouraged,	along	with	 the	support	
for bargaining councils’ dispute resolution functions. Delays in the settlement of cases 
have also been highlighted as a major challenge. It was however suggested that the 
emphasis on the speedy resolution of cases means that CCMA commissioners do not 
have the time or inclination to deal with the underlying issues of a dispute. 
Both the CCMA and the Labour Courts have been criticised for their overly strict 
interpretation of the requirement for procedural fairness. The lack of proper supervision 
and clear guidance from the Labour Courts has also placed huge burdens on CCMA 
commissioners to determine the correct process to follow in resolving disputes. While 
the	delays	 in	 the	 review	processes	 in	 the	Labour	Court	have	been	 identified	as	a	
problem,	the	most	critical	problem	is	the	 lack	of	clarity	about	 the	future	of	 the	Labour	
Courts. This renders it impossible, in the foreseeable future, to address the staffing 
problems as well as efficiency problems.
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 5. Conclusion
One of the key issues that appear common to all the debates concerning unfair 
dismissals,	 unfair	 labour	 practices	as	well	 as	 the	efficiency	of	 the	 labour	market	
institutions, is the urgent need to update the Code of Good Practice to reflect recent 
decisions and judgments of the CCMA and the Labour Courts. In addition, some of the 
guidelines in the Code can be simplified, particularly with regard to retrenchments. This 
would be an important first step in the policy process around labour market regulation.
Another critical issue is the overly strict interpretation of the requirement for procedural 
fairness when dismissing employees for misconduct or incapacity. While employers, 
legal	 advisors	as	well	 as	 the	 labour	market	 institutions	all	 follow	overly	 complex	
procedures, it has been suggested that the CCMA (supported by the Labour Courts) 
should	lead	by	example	and	not	demand	more	complex	pre-dismissal	procedures	than	
those required by the LRA. 
It	has	also	been	suggested	 that	managers	and	skilled	workers	should	be	excluded	
from dismissal laws as they enjoy adequate protection under contractual law. Experts 
disagree on how SMMEs should be treated, with some suggesting that they should 
be excluded from all legal requirements in terms of dismissal, while others feel that a 
separate Code of Good Practice should be drawn up for SMMEs. When it comes to 
retrenchments, it has been suggested that requirements with regard to notification can 
be limited when less than a particular number of workers is retrenched. 
There is general agreement that the LRA’s definition of what constitutes an unfair 
labour practice with regard to promotion, demotion, training, benefits, discipline short of 
dismissal, suspension and failure to reinstate or re-employ, should be reviewed. While 
some	experts	suggest	that	all	 the	unfair	 labour	practices	should	be	removed	from	the	
LRA, others prefer adding guidelines to the LRA or drawing up a separate Code of Good 
Practice to deal with unfair labour practices. Suspension pending disciplinary action is, 
however, very problematic, and requires immediate regulatory reform, particularly given 
the widespread abuse of suspension in the public sector. 
It	has	been	shown	 that	 there	 is	no	evidence	 to	support	 the	claims	 that	bargaining	
councils contribute to inefficiencies in the labour market. The extension and exemption 
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arrangements	appear	 to	work	well	and	bargaining	council	membership	 is	generally	
not associated with higher wages. The LRA’s vision for a strong system of collective 
bargaining at sectoral level did not, however, materialise. Bargaining council coverage 
is highly fragmented and limited to only a few sectors. It has been suggested that the 
Department	of	Labour	should	become	more	pro-active	in	supporting	sectoral	collective	
bargaining. Collective bargaining at the sector level may be the best way to extend 
protection to atypical workers. Additional financial support for bargaining councils to fulfil 
their dispute resolution functions will also relieve some of the pressure on the CCMA, 
which is battling to deal with the high number of referrals. 
In addition to the high number of referrals, the CCMA has also found it difficult to settle 
cases in the prescribed time frames. This is true for cases settled both at conciliation 
and arbitration. With CCMA commissioners under pressure to settle cases as quickly 
as	possible,	 this	means	that	 they	generally	do	not	have	the	 time	to	engage	with	 the	
underlying causes of a dispute. This has highlighted the importance of accrediting 
private	agencies	as	well	as	supporting	dispute	 resolution	at	bargaining	councils	 to	
relieve the pressure on the CCMA commissioners. In addition, skilled workers and 
bargaining	council	members	should	be	encouraged	to	refer	disputes	to	private	agencies	
or the relevant council. 
The Labour Courts have not succeeded in providing proper supervision and clear 
guidance to the CCMA commissioners in terms of the correct processes to follow when 
resolving disputes. Widely different judgements from the Labour Court have contributed 
to inconsistency and uncertainty where it comes to choosing the correct approach. 
There is general agreement that closer links should be forged between the CCMA and 
the Labour Courts to improve the efficiency of the dispute resolution system as a whole. 
The Labour Courts should provide clear and consistent guidelines for the CCMA and 
should engage with the CCMA when reviewing awards.
The most critical issue remains, however, the lack of clarity around the future of the 
Labour Courts. This makes it impossible to address the current shortage of full-time 
Labour	Court	 judges	and	 it	 also	means	 that	any	 further	 research	 to	evaluate	 the	
efficiency of the Labour Court in terms of the review process may prove to be futile.
Ultimately	 though,	 the	paper	has	provided	a	contemporaneous	overview	of	some	of	
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the key legal debates around labour market reform in South Africa since the 2002 
amendments. It is principally in trying to decode these debates for non-legal readers, 
however,	 that	 the	paper	hopes	 to	broaden	the	debate	and	discussion	around	 labour	
market regulation in South Africa.

A Synthesis of Current Issues in the Labour Regulatory Environment
 6. Bibliography
Bhorat, H. & Cheadle, H. 2007. Labour Reform in South Africa:  Measuring Regulation 
and a  Synthesis of Policy Suggestions.
Bhorat, H., Pauw, K & Ncube, L. 2007. Understanding the Efficiency and Effectiveness 
of the Dispute  Resolution System in South Africa: An Analysis of CCMA Data. 
Development Policy Research Unit. Draft Paper. September 2007.
Bhorat, H., van der Westhuizen, C., & Goga, S. 2007. Analysing Wage Formation in the 
South African Labour Market:   The Role of Bargaining Councils. Development 
Policy Research Unit. Draft Paper. September 2007
Benjamin, P. 2006. Friend or Foe?  The Impact of Judicial Decisions on the Operation of 
the CCMA. Development Policy Research Unit. December 2006.
Benjamin. P. & Gruen, C. 2006. The Regulatory Efficiency of the CCMA:   A Statistical 
Analysis of the  CCMA’s CMS Database. Development Policy Research Unit 
Working Paper. No 06/110. June 2006
Benjamin, P. & Theron, J. 2007. Costing, Comparing and Competing. Developing an 
approach	to	the	benchmarking	of	labour	market	regulation
Besley, T & Burgess, R. 2004. Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? 
Evidence from  India. In Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol 119. Issue 1. 
February 2004.
Cheadle, H. 2006. Regulated Flexibility and Small Business:   Revisiting the LRA and the 
BCEA. Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper. No 06/109. June 
2006
Godfrey, S., Maree, J. & Theron, J. 2006. Conditions of Employment and Small 
Business:		
 Coverage, Compliance and Exemptions. Development Policy Research Unit 
Working Paper No 06/106, March 2006. Cape Town: University of Cape 
Town.
Levy, A. & Venter, T. 2006. Conciliation and Arbitration and the settlement of disputes of 
right in South Africa. In Tokiso Review 2005/06. The First Annual Report on the 
State of Labour Dispute Resolution in South Africa. Johannesburg:   Tokiso 
Dispute Resolution Settlement  (Pty) Ltd
National Treasury (formerly Department of Finance). 1996. Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution:  A Macroeconomic Strategy. Pretoria:   Government Printers. 
DPRU Working Paper 09/136                                     Haroon Bhorat, Carlene van der Westhuizen

Republic of South Africa. 1995. Labour Relations Act. No 66 of 1995. Available from 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/index.htm
Republic of South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. No 108 of 
1996.  Available from http://www.info.gov.za/documents/index.htm
Republic of South Africa. 1997. Basic Conditions of Employment Act. No 75 of 1997
Republic of South Africa. 2008. Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1997. Determination: 
Earnings Threshold. Government Gazette. Vol. 512, No 30720. 1 February 
2008. Government Printer: Pretoria
Roskam. A. 2007. An Exploratory Look into Labour Market Regulation. Development 
Policy Research Unit Working Paper. No 07/116. January 2007
Van Niekerk. A. 2007. Regulating Flexibility and Small Business: Revisiting the LRA and 
BCEA A Response to Halton Cheadle’s Concept Paper. Development Policy 
Research Unit Working  Paper. No 07/119. March 2007
